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.Here the target is  thestandpoint of distribution, as opposed to  the standpoint of production. Inanother aspect, however, Young recapitulates Amartya Sen s objection toapproaches that focus on the distribution of commodities, as opposed tocapabilities, thereby casting people as passive consumers instead of asagents.2 Here the critique is aimed, not at distribution per se, but at distri-bution of the wrong goods.In a third aspect, finally, Young s critique isaimed precisely at approaches, like Sen s, that treat nontangibles such ascapabilities as foci and objects of distribution.Here the target is  reification.No matter how we resolve these ambiguities, the important point is this:none of Young s objections to  the distributive paradigm constitutes a per-suasive argument against approaches that assess the justice of socialarrangements in terms of how they distribute economic advantages and dis-advantages.Although made from the  standpoint of distribution, suchjudgments need not entail that remedies for injustice be limited to such mea-sures as equalizing income through redistributive taxation.Instead, they canprovide good reasons for condemning the underlying  basic structure of asociety and for seeking its wholesale transformation.Young herself makessuch judgments throughout her book.In so doing, she generally follows Senin defining economic advantage and disadvantage in terms of capabilities.This, however, puts her squarely inside the distributive paradigm, broadlyconceived, her qualms about reification notwithstanding.Nor could sheescape that paradigm with respect to socio-economic justice, finally, byopposing its extension to issues of cultural justice as well.Rather, as I shallshow, she effectively adds a second, recognition problematic alongside it.Despite Young s explicit caveats, then, redistribution remains relevant toJustice and the Politics of Difference.If redistribution represents an implicit presence in Young s book, thenrecognition constitutes its gravitational center.The recognition paradigmundeniably dominates the book, reflecting Young s identification with3118 Ch-19.qxd 11/13/03 9:44 AM Page 208208 Contemporary Political Theorycontemporary new social movements.Her stated aim is, in fact, to explicate,and defend, the theory of justice that is implicit in the political practice ofmovements such as feminism, gay and lesbian liberation, and anti-racism.What is distinctive about these movements, as she presents them, is their viewof the dominant culture as a locus of oppression, their rejection of the  ideal ofassimilation, and their demand for the recognition of difference.Theorizingcultural recognition is therefore central to the project of Young s book.Accordingly, Young mounts a challenge to theories that would exclude thedomain of culture from the scope of justice.She makes a compelling case forthe view that the dominant images, symbolic associations, and interpreta-tions of a culture may denigrate and degrade some social groups; they mayeven find expression in unconscious and preconscious reactions of bodilyaversion in everyday life in ways that constitute serious harm.Culture,therefore, may be oppressive and unjust.No theory of justice can withjustice ignore it.Young also follows contemporary movements in defending the  politics ofdifference. By this she means a  cultural revolution in which social groupdifferences cease to be viewed as deviations from a single norm and are seen,rather, as cultural variations.Far from seeking to abolish such differences,then, Young aims to preserve and affirm them.This politics of difference isso central to her vision that it appears in the title of her book.It is herdistinctive politics of recognition.Despite her continuing interest in the politics of redistribution, then,Young s primary focus is the politics of recognition.She returns to the latteragain and again, in virtually every chapter of the book.By contrast, her treat-ment of political economy is somewhat cursory.To be sure, at least three ofthe five forms of oppression that Young identifies are based in political econ-omy, but that domain receives only one chapter-length elaboration namely,in the chapter that criticizes  the myth of merit and the division betweentask-defining and task-executing labor.Virtually every other chapter, in con-trast, focuses primarily on cultural oppression and its remedy, the  politicsof difference.The dominance of the cultural paradigm over the political-economy para-digm is not merely a matter of length of treatment, however.It can also beread in some of Young s central categorical conceptions, as indeed can someunresolved tensions between the cultural and the political-economic dimen-sions of her framework.Defining OppressionConsider, first, Young s general definition of oppression as  the institutionalconstraint on self-development (37).To be oppressed, in her view, is to beinhibited from  developing and exercising one s capacities and expressingone s experience (37).More elaborately:  Oppression consists in systematicinstitutional processes which prevent some people from learning and using3118 Ch-19.qxd 11/13/03 9:44 AM Page 209Recognition or Redistribution? 209satisfying and expansive skills in socially recognized settings, or institutionalprocesses which inhibit people s ability to play and communicate withothers or to express their feelings and perspectives on social life in contextswhere others can listen (38).There are many interesting and attractive features of this definition.Thefocus on capacities, for example, provides a welcome corrective toapproaches that focus on resource distribution and implicitly posit people asinactive consumers [ Pobierz całość w formacie PDF ]