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.191Second, and more importantly, the rationale for the dual keystemmed from the ground commanders responsibilities forforce protection and mission success.In a combat scenariothese responsibilities would normally be complementary, andairpower would support both the security of the ground forcesand the accomplishment of a common mission.In Bosnia, how-ever, when AFSOUTH commanders used airpower for enforce-ment, they endangered both UNPROFOR s forces and its pri-mary mission.UNPROFOR commanders needed the dual-keymechanism to fulfill their command responsibilities.However,when the Bosnian Serb surface-to-air threat increased, the187RESPONSIBILITY OF COMMANDdual-key control over SEAD strikes interfered with the air-men s right to self-defense.Nearly every NATO aircraft operating over Bosnia was inca-pable of an immediate riposte in self-defense to SAM firings.Even multirole aircraft, suitable for air-to-air and air-to-ground missions, were incapable of effectively responding tohaving a missile fired at them.192 Unlike certain UN soldierswho had armored vehicles that were sufficiently well protectedto drive through Serb roadblocks, the NATO airmen for theirsurvival had to depend primarily on avoiding fire rather thanwithstanding it.An aircraft that had just dodged a missilewould not be well positioned to return fire against the offend-ing site.Therefore, NATO air forces needed specialized SEADaircraft to cope with the Bosnian Serb SAM threat.These spe-cialized aircraft were scarce resources and were generally notsuitable for other missions such as close air support or enforc-ing the no-fly zone.193 Moreover, the Bosnian Serb integratedair defense system allowed the launching of missiles with verylittle or no warning to the aircrews being fired upon.This tac-tic greatly reduced the time SEAD aircraft would have forresponding to a threat, and this, in turn, would degrade theprotection afforded by SEAD escort.Commanders in AFSOUTH were responsible for missions toenforce Security Council resolutions and NATO decisions, andin practice these missions were directed almost exclusivelyagainst the Bosnian Serbs.Therefore, the Bosnian Serbs weremost unlikely to consent to having NATO aircraft overhead theparts of Bosnia where enforcement might be needed.This sit-uation left NATO with five possible courses of action: (1) con-duct a SEAD campaign to destroy the Bosnian Serb airdefenses; (2) make forceful responses through retrospectiveSEAD to induce self-restraint from the Bosnian Serbs; (3) pro-vide SEAD escorts for missions over Bosnia; (4) avoid theBosnian Serb air defenses; and (5) ignore the threat and con-tinue to operate over Bosnia.This last option would have beena gross dereliction of duty by NATO commanders.Moreover,the US SROE clearly and repeatedly stated:   A commanderhas the authority and obligation to use all necessary meansavailable and to take all appropriate action to defend that188COMPETING MISSIONS AND DEMANDS FOR FORCE PROTECTIONcommander s unit and other US forces in the vicinity from ahostile act or demonstrated hostile intent.  194 The firstoption conducting a SEAD campaign was too extreme forUN authorities.195 The second option conducting retrospec-tive SEAD was permitted on one occasion and then blockedby UN commanders mainly because of the vulnerability of UNforces.The UN commanders did not like the third optionheavy SEAD escort over Bosnia because it meant that NATOaircraft could only fly over Bosnia during brief periods whenthe specialized SEAD aircraft were available, thus greatlyreducing the UN s ability to call on close air support.Moreover,in the eyes of the Bosnian Serbs, these escorted missions wereindistinguishable from the large packages of aircraft used forair strikes.The more threatened the Serbs felt, the more theyused their air defense system.The more they used their airdefense system, the more NATO felt the need to actually attackthe air defense.So, heavily escorted packages tended to feedthe cycle of escalating force.The final option avoidingBosnian Serb air defenses equated to abandoning NATO sresponsibilities over Bosnia, in order to secure force protection.There were no good options that would permit both the UNcommanders and the NATO commanders to accomplish theirdisparate missions within the bounds of acceptable risks totheir forces [ Pobierz całość w formacie PDF ]