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.The growing cooperation between Churchill and Stalin and the uneasy suspicion that the two would make agreements at Poland's expense haunted Sikorski during 1942.This was the time when Churchill became increasingly concerned with supplying and aiding the Soviet war effort.Churchill and Anthony Eden's repeated statements that Poland's fate would be decided at post-war conferences, did little to reduce Polish anxieties.During the middle of 1942 Sikorski tried to open talks on what he hoped would be a forthcoming continental war.He requested that an Allied General Staff be formed to plan joint military action.In the summer he went further in asking that future military action on the continent should be coordinated to coincide with the activities of the Home Army in Poland.Thus he hoped that plans for the liberation of Poland would become a Western concern.In all these efforts Sikorski was not able to motivate the British military leaders to commit themselves to joint plans for the liberation of Poland.40In the middle of November Sikorski tried to return to the subject of continental action by putting to Churchill and to General Alan Brook, Chief of Imperial General Staff, a memorandum which outlined the anticipated future course of the war.41 Sikorski reiterated his belief that the Soviet Union did not have the power to ultimately defeat the German war capacity.He also believed that an attack on the German heartland from the North or West would not be successful, since the German military leaders would have anticipated it and prepared their defences.Thus Sikorski advocated a thrust into Eastern Europe from the Balkans in the northerly direction.This would have the advantage of an attack on Germany's unprotected flank.It would also allow for the creation of an Eastern Front, which would preclude Soviet entry into Poland and Central Europe.In his proposal Sikorski expected that the Home Army's plan for a national uprising would play a pivotal role in the ultimate defeat of Germany.Naturally he envisaged that Western supplies would be provided for the Home Army to play its allotted role.Polish troops in the Middle East would be utilized on the Balkan Front allowing them to arrive in Poland in good time to consolidate frontiers and to establish the first post-war authority.42 The Independent Parachute Brigade, built up in Scotland from the best available Polish manpower evacuated from France, was to be dropped into Poland with the explicit aim of capturing key installations and forestalling a revolution.Unfortunately for Sikorski and the exile government's long-term plans, this attempt to draw the British into action, which would have consolidated his long-term plans for Western participation in the liberation of Poland and create a barrier to the Soviet entry, failed.Sikorski was informed that his plans were premature as Britain had no proposal for military action east of Germany.For the Poles this spelled the end of their plans, which linked the Home Army's role in Poland to that of the government-in-exile's role in the West.When on 31 January 1943 the German army surrendered at Stalingrad Western and Soviet hopes that the Nazi momentum had stalled were realized.Henceforth the Red Army would take the initiative and the likelihood of their entry into Eastern Europe in pursuit of the retreating Wehrmacht became a real possibility, and viewed from a Western point of view, very much a desirability.The liberation of Poland was increasingly likely to take place in the wake of Soviet action against the retreating German units.Thus Sikorski's carefully structured plans for the balancing of the Poles' contribution to the war effort, and the linking of military action in the West with that in occupied Poland, unravelled.The government-in-exile was facing the possibility that it would lose control over developments within the underground movement while at the same time being sidelined within the community of the allies which would determine the post war European balance of power.12345678ConclusionBibliography1Poland under Occupation, 1941-1942The Polish government-in-exile's aim of limiting the underground movement's natural desire for independence was affected by the nature of communication links.While the government was in France these were maintained on a regular basis, mainly through the constant movement of messengers.In addition to Hungary and Rumania turning a blind eye to Poles passing through their territories, Italy could be counted on to show some degree of tolerance.At the time of the German attack on Poland, Italy did not declare war on Poland and the Sikorski government took care not to antagonize Italy.The Polish ambassador in Rome, Wi en i a wa - D i u go szo ws k i was, moreover, able to obtain Count Galeazo Ciano's tacit approval for the passage of thousands of Poles to France, where it was known they were being enlisted in the Polish units.1 The fall of France and the flight of the Polish government to London made this traffic difficult but not impossible.Thus throughout the war couriers and emissaries continued to make their way from occupied Poland to neutral states from where, with the aid of the Polish consular services, they would proceed to Britain.Spain, Switzerland and Sweden all acted as transit routes for messengers carrying information, instructions and funds from the exile community to Poland and enquiries and requests from Poland to London.2 The distinction between couriers and emissaries was that couriers were merely carriers of messages, whereas emissaries carried information between the government and the parties which supported it in London.Their function was to Base between the two.3In March 1941 regular radio links between Poles in Britain and the occupied territories were established.These were maintained throughout the war and even after the British government withdrew recognition from the London Poles.From 1942 the government maintained daily radio contact in this way [ Pobierz całość w formacie PDF ]