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.Isenberg used the hit list that CSR and the CMA had prepared andwidely circulated (without attribution) to ridicule the program.According to Miller,those who wished to protect the Health Education Account were not given much of anopportunity to do so:It was a fairly perfunctory hearing.& I mean, after berating us, they didn't take anyevidence.Then Phil announced the findings that he intended to move the money outof Health Education into these other programs.And I remember Ken Maddy[Republican minority leader] was sitting next to him and Ken turned to him and said, But we all agreed that that was not possible. And Phil said something to the effectthat  things are different now. And I realized that that was the first Maddy knew theywere going to go for four-fifths and that they were going to change it.It was aDemocratic initiative, 816 was.& Maddy quickly realized what was going on and goton board in a hurry.[20] 259 Supporters of the health education programs were surprised to find that Isenberg wasa leader in attacking the programs.Isenberg sought to paint the health advocates whowere seeking to protect Proposition 99 as being just another special interest nowaddicted to public funding.Isenberg pointed out to a Los Angeles Times reporter thatmany of the same groups who were now fighting the use of Health Education Accountfunds for health screening and prenatal care programs had agreed to this use in thepast.According to Isenberg, these groups  have taken on the garb of a religiouscrusade. [1]Martin, responding on behalf of the ALA, wrote that they were  shocked byIsenberg's comments.[39] She pointed out that Proposition 99 funds distributed to ALArepresented less than 4 percent of ALA's budgets from around the state of Californiaand was only.001 percent of the 1993-1994 tax revenues.She argued that theappropriation should be made, not only because it was a voter mandate but alsobecause the program had demonstrated its effectiveness.She pointed out that criticizing a few programs cannot erase the tremendous total impact of this complexprevention program. Neither ACS nor AHA took Proposition 99 money.The University of California had generally been quiet about the Research Account,reflecting its position as a public body whose board of regents is chaired by thegovernor.This stance sometimes frustrated the university's allies.For example, in1992 AHA officials had written to University of California president Jack Peltason toexpress their disappointment at the university's failure to oppose diversion of theResearch Account funds and the hope that  the University of California will take aleading role in opposing such attempts. [40] Put to the test again in 1994, the universitywould again play a cautious role.UC lobbyist Cathrine Castoreno was frustrated trying to protect the Research Accountin the 1994 hearings.University representatives testified on behalf of the ResearchAccount but without drawing any lines in the sand and, in fact, worked toaccommodate Isenberg.According to Castoreno,I gave explicit testimony about what was most definitely illegal versus what theymight possibly be able to do.This is a point in the proceedings towards the end of theConference Committee on 816 where it was clear that there was going to be adiversion of Research Account monies.The issue was how much and how.We werepretty well beat up by that time& so, in an effort to try and keep the program frombeing completely defunded and to keep them from making a move that would bewholly illegal, I worked with our counsel and Dr.[Cornelius] Hopper [UC's vicepresident for health affairs] to put 260 together an analysis of 99 and see, given their goal to divert money, how they mightdo it legally.& We made it very clear that simply using the money straight out of theResearch Account for health services or any other purpose was obviously and clearlyillegal and challengeable in court.And they thanked us very much for that[laughter].[18]The university even provided a written proposal on how the Research Account mightlegitimately be used for other purposes, such as by explicitly amending the initiativeto put the diverted money into the Unallocated Account instead of directly fundingmedical care from the Research Account.The university's official position onreducing the Research Account from 5 percent to 3 percent was  neutral. [41]The schools were also subjected to a harsh review by Isenberg, who was frustrated bythe lack of tobacco programming there.By March 1994, after the program had beenrunning for four years in the schools, the evaluation conducted for the CaliforniaDepartment of Education (CDE) by Southwest Regional Laboratory reported that 41percent of youth in grades 7 through 12 reported at least one tobacco lesson andactivity event.[42] This finding also meant, of course, that 59 percent did not, despitethe fact that the schools had received a total of $147 million in Proposition 99 funds inthe 1993-1994 fiscal year.[43] Through the spring of 1994 all schools were gettingentitlement money based on average daily attendance.The report also pointed out that the DATE [Drug, Alcohol, and Tobacco Education] program needs clear definitionof the model and its components in order to standardize and focus prevention andreduction efforts targeting school youth. [42] The health groups generally agreed withIsenberg's criticisms of the schools.[20]The CMAIn 1992 Steve Thompson, who had served as Assembly Speaker Willie Brown's chiefof staff and the head of the Assembly Office of Research, had moved to the CMA tobecome its vice president and head lobbyist.This job change put him in a powerfulposition from which to continue to advocate for the diversions out of the HealthEducation Account into CHDP, a program he had helped design years earlier whileworking for Brown.Brown and the tobacco industry were both interested in shiftingHealth Education and Research monies into other programs.The CMA continued to portray its position as a painful choice between taking care ofpoor children and funding prevention programs that have a longer-term benefit.In theend, of course, providing money 261 for medical providers always took priority [ Pobierz całość w formacie PDF ]