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.24I met with Danilo Aguirre and Alberto Saborío, expressing my concern that25Somoza was being violent and intransigent in his speeches, even daring the26United States to send the marines.The fao had voted 11 to 4 for the immediate27resignation formula, but Somoza was going to say no, so they again raised their28constitutional solution to end the regime in April 1979 as a position for the29mediation to be able to return to the fao.It was becoming increasingly clear30that the mediation would have to make a proposal of its own if the impasse was31to be broken.One morning the cia chief of station came to see me:  What we32need here is covert action to undermine Somoza s National Guard and Liberal33Party support.Otherwise we cannot win, he said.It seemed more ethical to34deliver an ultimatum than to plan the assassination of a dictator, but there are35actions between extremes.3637 The mediation was left only with exercising economic pressures on the38 government to obtain its collaboration.The U.S.Treasury had postponed39 badly needed International Monetary Fund (imf) credit.La Prensa was pub-40 licizing the suspension of usaid disbursements.45 From Washington camemediation 2251 another signal of pressure: Nicaragua would receive an increase in its export2 quota of cattle only if the mediation were successful.The minister of finance,3 retired general Samuel Genie, came to see me to protest La Prensa s articles4 and seek a clarification of policy.Genie, who had headed the secret police,5 was a serious, courteous officer who always manifested his absolute loyalty to6 Somoza.Nicaragua, he said, was making payments on time into their bilateral7 projects what was the delay?8 We did not have instructions to formally suspend any money in the pipeline;9 the instructions to embassy personnel were to respond  no comment when10 asked.We could not give a blunt and decisive message, such as that the U.S.11 would boycott the economy until a constitutional transition was worked out.12 The structural constraints of our assistance programs were once more man-[225], (38)13 ifest: formal bureaucratic deadlines had to be met internally and in public14 presentations.We again saw the potential for disruption that the system posed15 in its lack of synchronization with local realities.Public discussions were nowLines: 65616 taking place in the Congress about economic assistance with figures that  17 made no sense in terms of the extant situation.46 If a new government was0.0pt Pg18 not inaugurated, major violence was predictable, thus making inoperative any  19 budgeted amounts; conversely, if the crisis were resolved, one would hope forNormal Pa20 a much larger American assistance to the new government.In fact, a totalPgEnds: TE21 economic boycott was not even contemplated in Washington.4722 On October 20 the Catholic Church issued a message.First, constitutional23 arguments of legality could not be above the common good (i.e., a transitional[225], (38)24 government without the Somozas had to be formed soon).Second, morality25 had to prevail: the leaders should not  fall in the temptation of retaliation,26 rancor, and vengeance. In the spirit of the post Vatican II social reformism, a27  new sociopolitical order had to be installed,  affirming the national identity28 versus a constant and permanent foreign intervention. It was as if Monsignor29 Obando had started to distrust the mediation, as if a (final) foreign intervention30 to end all intervention by forming a popular and progressive new regime were31 being demanded more angrily.32 Meanwhile, Washington was telling other countries of the need to support33 the mediation.Panamanian Torrijos and Venezuelan Pérez were contacted,34 and Pérez was asked to convince the Group of Twelve to maintain fao unity35 and to negotiate a solution with the Liberal Party.Pérez s position was that36 the crux of the problem was to devise the mechanism to get rid of Somoza;37 once the opposition and Somoza knew this, negotiations would then be pos-38 sible.However, in his opinion, the confiscation of Somoza s properties was39 inevitable, which handicapped the role for his Liberal Party.In short, the40 United States had to orchestrate the change of government.The mediation226 mediation1 would propose a formula for  national reconciliation based on Somoza s2 immediate resignation and the formation of a provisional junta.3 Unfortunately, we could not be optimistic.The mediation had concentrated4 efforts that obtained from the fao a proposal for a transitional regime that5 reasonable men had to judge unacceptable to those in power.The general was6 making statements that  proved his obsession to never relinquishing control7 of the state.488 The Opposition Splits9 On October 25 we learned of the withdrawal of the Twelve both from the10 fao and the mediation.It was sad that after all our efforts, they would break11 with the hope of a peaceful settlement.I understood their position, however.12 There were no signs that the mediation could obtain the formation of a new[226], (313 government in a reasonable time frame, thus in the group s mind war was14 inevitable unless U.S.policy changed.They had tired of playing Somoza s15 mediation charade and wished to influence the U.S.government attacking itsLines: 616 policy.  17 The Twelve s merit had been their sponsorship of a role for the Sandinistas0.0pt18 in the country s future regime.Despite the presence of intellectuals in the  19 group, its platform had remained rudimentary, with no discussion about aShort Pa20 new social order beyond their original position: a democratic regime with civilPgEnds:21 liberties, a new system of property starting with an agrarian reform within22 a mixed economy, and nonalignment in the international arena ending the23 dependency on the United States.The Twelve s priority had been to terminate[226], (324 the dictatorship.25 Their linkage with the fsln, however, posed problems.As we saw, San-26 dinista propaganda had indicated the continuation of authoritarian Marxist-27 Leninist roots among top core leaders.Indeed, some members of the Twelve28 vocally claimed that they were trying to  moderate the Sandinistas.29 In any case, because of their political demands, the Twelve s spokesmen in30 Nicaragua had not been facilitating a compromise with the ruling group.Iron-31 ically, the devastation finally brought about by the coming all-out war marred32 the efforts to perpetuate the future Sandinista regime, given its economic33 vulnerability and consequent dependency on the wealthy foreign democracies.34 And the Twelve s ideological-social heterogeneity, including the substantial35 presence of the haute bourgeoisie in it, added to the Sandinista regime s36 incoherence.37 When announcing their decision, about half of the Twelve who were in38 Nicaragua obtained political asylum in the Mexican Embassy.This represented39 an implicit recognition that they had been operating under the assumption of40mediation 2271 American protection, and that now they felt that they could not count on2 it [ Pobierz caÅ‚ość w formacie PDF ]