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.We toldthem our problem and they promptly sent us what we needed: a battery-powered, wireless bug concealed in a thin wooden panel.On the topof the panel were small, sharp metal spikes enabling an agent to affixthe bug to the underside of a table.The bug looked perfect.In thesummer of 1967, we decided to put the plan into action.After studying a detailed diagram of the Armed Services Commit-tee hearing room, the TASS correspondent went to an open hearing,the device in his pocket.When the hearing adjourned, he milledabout for a while, then stealthily withdrew the bug and quickly affixedit to the underside of a table.We had agents with a receiver waiting in a car just a few blocksfrom the Capitol, but they were unable to pick up anything.The bugdidn t work.At the time, we didn t know why, figuring the device wasfaulty or had been discovered.Decades later, when I returned toAmerica in 1991 as a critic of the KGB, a member of the American in-telligence community told me they had found the bug, disarmed it,and left it in place.0465014453-Kalugin.qxd 11/24/08 10:25 AM Page 102102 SPYMASTER Mr.Kalugin, we know it was your idea to bug the House commit-tee, the American said. Yes, of course, I replied. Well, the American said, smiling,  we found the bug. Hmm, I replied, also grinning. I didn t know that.At the time, we had been afraid to retrieve the bug from the ArmedServices Committee, worried the FBI would be waiting for us andwould turn the matter into an international incident.So we neverwent back for the wooden panel, and it was a good thing: Years later,the American intelligence source said the FBI had been waiting for us.We had better luck with a more far-reaching attempt at electroniceavesdropping.Our technical people in Moscow had devised state-of-the-art antennas capable of intercepting all open airwave communi-cations.In 1967, we placed the antennas on the roof of our embassy,and suddenly we were able to overhear the communications of thePentagon, the FBI, the State Department, the White House, the localpolice, and a host of other agencies.These communications werebroadcast on open, nonsecure channels, and a surprising amount ofuseful material was relayed over the airwaves.Transcripts of the con-versations, when compared with classified sources of information atour disposal, enabled us to piece together everything from the secre-tary of state s travel schedule to the latest crimes being investigated bythe FBI.Over the course of several years, one of the most amusing conver-sations we overheard and one which delighted our superiors inMoscow was an intercepted phone conversation between the na-tional security adviser at the time, Henry Kissinger, and his fiancée,Nancy Maginnes.He apparently had just given a speech and, in hisegotistical manner, was asking her what she thought of it.He was say-ing, in effect,  How did I look? You really thought I sounded well?The transcript showed Kissinger to be a vain and boastful man.Weforwarded it to Moscow, not thinking much of it.Then word cameback that Yuri Andropov, chairman of the KGB, loved the interceptedconversation.He had reported on it to a regular meeting of the ruling0465014453-Kalugin.qxd 11/24/08 10:25 AM Page 103WASHI NGTON STATI ON 103Communist Party Politburo, proudly showing the Soviet Union sleaders that his KGB officers in Washington were so on the ball thatthey were plucking out of the air the intimate conversations ofRichard Nixon s national security adviser.tA substantial part of the KGB effort in the United States went into dis-crediting the federal government and its agencies.The Washington station, like its New York counterpart, was en-gaged in a series of active measures to counter what we saw as anti-Soviet propaganda emanating from the United States.We evendreamed up some anti-American propaganda of our own.While Iwas in Washington, the Soviet Union was under increasing attack fordiscriminating against Jews and refusing to allow some Jews to emi-grate.Our bosses in Moscow branded these attacks as an  ideologicaldiversion and ordered us to fight them.We did so by once againflooding American Jewish organizations with anonymous, rabidlyanti-Semitic materials.Then, of course, the Soviet media faithfully re-ported on the wave of anti-Semitic activity sweeping America.In the late 1960s and 1970s, one of our station s more innovative dirtytricks campaigns involved doctoring purloined American documents.We would take CIA, Pentagon, or State Department documentsobtained from a variety of sources insert sinister phrases in them,stamp them TOP SECRET, and pass them on to leftist journalists inAmerica or around the world.For example, we might obtain a StateDepartment document about the threat of Communist takeovers inItaly or France.The document might primarily have been an analysisof left-wing movements in those countries, but we would insert asentence such as  The United States government, after assessing thesituation, suggests that the U.S.must put its troops on alert. It was alla lie, and the American media didn t fall for such ruses.But worldmedia often regurgitated our disinformation, and our own mediawould have a field day with the KGB-doctored documents showingthat America was an aggressive, imperialistic nation.None of these0465014453-Kalugin.qxd 11/24/08 10:25 AM Page 104104 SPYMASTERactive measures had a determining effect on the outcome of the coldwar, but they were a nuisance for the United States and played a rolein our ongoing propaganda battle.Under Solomatin, our station also stepped up efforts to locate So-viet defectors from the postwar era.In some cases, such as that of YuriNosenko, our assignment was to carry out the death sentences handeddown by Soviet courts.These assassination efforts were known as wet jobs, and in my time in Washington our superiors in Moscowwere extremely reluctant to order such killings.I m certain that hadwe found Nosenko we would have received permission to kill him, butit was a moot point.We never located him.We did, however, manageto find other defectors.Our goal was to re-recruit them or lure themback to the Soviet Union to score a propaganda coup against theUnited States.One of these cases was initiated by Nikolai Popov, who came to Wash-ington around 1967 as the new chief of counterintelligence.Heworked closely with Solomatin and me to locate Soviet defectors onAmerican soil.Perhaps the most intriguing story was that of NikolaiFyodorovich Artamonov.The effort to bring Artamonov back to Rus-sia was a convoluted affair involving double and triple dealing.Beforeit was over, Artamonov s case would also be the only time, in all myyears with the KGB, when I was present at the death of a spy withwhom I had become involved.Nikolai Artamonov was a tall, handsome seaman who had servedwith a Soviet naval squadron in the Polish port of Gdansk in the1950s.He was extremely bright and regarded by his superiors as oneof the finest young officers in the Soviet Baltic fleet.While only in hisearly thirties, he was given command of a torpedo-equipped de-stroyer.He was being considered for transfer to the Naval Forces Staff,where he would have been promoted to admiral in due time.Arta-monov, however, fell in love with a Polish woman, and in June 1959he commandeered a launch and defected with his lover to Sweden.Heleft behind a wife and young son.In Sweden and later in America0465014453-Kalugin [ Pobierz caÅ‚ość w formacie PDF ]