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.Someone of equal stature and forcefulnessto Powell was needed; thus Cheney reached out to his former mentor Rumsfeld,bypassing Wolfowitz, who was notoriously slow at moving paper and notregarded as a top administrator.Having missed the top Pentagon job, Wolfowitzsought the number two position at State, but Powell didn t want him.Powelloffered him a cabinet position as Ambassador to the United Nations, but thatwould have put Wolfowitz in New York, out of the power loop.Number two atthe Pentagon suited him better.Thus, the vice president, defense secretary, anddeputy defense secretary were all associates of the Project for the New AmericanCentury, as was Powell s number two at State, Dick Armitage.From there the unipolarist appointments went all the way down.Of theeighteen figures who signed the PNAC s 1998 letter to Clinton calling for regimechange in Iraq, eleven took positions in the Bush administration.In addition toArmitage, Rumsfeld, and Wolfowitz, they were Elliott Abrams (Senior Directorfor Near East, Southwest Asian and North African Affairs on the NationalSecurity Council); John Bolton (Undersecretary, Arms Control and InternationalSecurity); Paula Dobriansky (Undersecretary of State for Global Affairs);Zalmay Khalilzad (President s Special Envoy to Afghanistan and Ambassador-at-Large for Free Iraqis); Richard Perle (chair of the Defense Policy Board); PeterW.Rodman (Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs);William Schneider, Jr.(chair of the Pentagon s Defense Science Board); andRobert B.Zoellick (U.S.Trade Representative).Other PNAC associates and/orprominent unipolarists who landed positions included Kenneth Adelman(Defense Policy Board), Stephen Cambone (Director of the Pentagon Office of BENEVOLENT GLOBAL HEGEMONY 131Program, Analysis and Evaluation); Eliot Cohen (Defense Policy Board); DevonGaffney Cross (Defense Policy Board); Douglas Feith (Undersecretary ofDefense), I.Lewis Libby (Vice President s Chief of Staff); William Luti andAbram Shulsky (eventually, directors of the Pentagon s Office of Special Plans);James Woolsey (Defense Policy Board); and David Wurmser (Special Assistantto the Undersecretary of State for Arms Control).Cheney s influence wasamplified by the fact that his chief staff, Scooter Libby, also served as assistantto the president and national security adviser to the vice president.46By all appearances, this extraordinary harvest of appointments put the neoconsin the driver s seat of the new administration.But, for eight months, until 9/11,they didn t feel that way.They worried about Powell s influence over thepresident; Cheney was hard to read; Bush had other priorities; and Rice wasn tone of them.The complaining began very early.Shortly before Bush sinauguration, Kagan declared that the incoming administration had an obvioussplit between its leading hawks (Rumsfeld and Wolfowitz) and leading doves(Powell and Rice), and that even Bush s commitment to missile defense wasjeopardized by it.Powell was a longtime skeptic about missile defense, Kagannoted, and he had wanted the defense post to go to his friend and longtimeopponent of missile defense, Pennsylvania Governor Tom Ridge.Rice  sviewpoint was not well defined, or at least not known, but she probably sharedthe skepticism of her former boss and mentor, Scowcroft.Kagan warned: Whether the hawks or the doves prevail depends on the president, of course, butthe president s judgment will depend on whom he s listening to.So far Bush smissile defense briefings would seem to have come exclusively from thedoves. 47On the latter issue, he was in a position to know.Bulging with connections tothe new administration, he and Kristol doled out inside dope that reflected thefrustrations of their friends, and their own.Bush campaigned as an Eisenhower,they judged, not a Reagan, but America desperately needed a Reaganitepresident who fought for American interests and scared people:  Bush scampaign from the beginning was designed not to scare anyone, anywhere, onany issue. Kristol and Kagan declared that the first six months of Bush spresidency would reveal whether he was a Reagan-style fighter; their chiefconsolation was that Bush appointed Rumsfeld and Rumsfeld appointedWolfowitz [ Pobierz całość w formacie PDF ]