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.e.operatively, know how to do it.But as cycling welldoes not involve acknowledging or being able to cite laws of dynamics,one can scarcely speak of cycling scrupulously.Roughly, this sort of thingis a reflex and not an observance.Conscience, then, is one species, among others, of scrupulousness; andscrupulousness is the operative acceptance of a rule or principle whichconsists in the disposition to behave, in all modes of behaviour, includingsaying to oneself and others, teaching, chiding, etc., in accordance withthe rule.Scruples, whether of conscience or of any other species ofscrupulousness, occur only when the normal actualisation of the dis-position is impeded or balked.And they, too, are only a special way inwhich the disposition is actualised, viz.when it cannot be normally actual-ised.The reason why my conscience is not spoken of as either judging orcommanding other people is the same as the reason why, in general, aman can be described as scrupulous only about his own acts, namely,that full operative acceptance of the rule can (logically) take the form onlyof conducting oneself in accordance with the rule.Your actions can t(logically) be exercises of or exhibit my skill, readiness, capacity, enthusi-asm, etc.This answer to the original puzzle will, of course, provoke the objectionthat it denies the hallowed distinctions between cognition, emotion andvolition.For I am saying that in one sense, and a very important sense, ofthe word my being  convinced of something or my  knowing it do notcause but consist in my tending to feel certain feelings and to enact certainactions.It will be said that a thought may engender dispositions to feel and toact, but that these dispositions are not the causes of themselves.I reply: (1) Then must it also be said that when I think in words, mysaying so and so to myself is the effect of the thinking and not a constituentof it, that I first think and then tell myself what I have thought? But then Imust think also what to tell myself and how to tell it, and this thinkingmust also have its own articulation which must in its turn be premeditatedand so on.Thinking is talking sensibly, but then why should it notequally be behaving sensibly?(2) The present view, that among the criteria (not the symptoms) ofbelief and knowledge are dispositions to feel certain emotions and per-form certain actions does not entail that  thinking ,  feeling and  doingare synonymous.It is still necessary to distinguish impulsive, reflex andautomatic from intelligent, careful, purposive, deliberate and scrupulous202 COLLECTED PAPERS: VOLUME 2actions; and silly from sensible, careless from careful, deliberate fromunpremeditated, behaviour.Similarly, feeling indignant, shocked, awed,amused, thwarted, respectful differ from feeling uneasy, angry, or sleepy.Only rational beings in rational states of mind (i.e.not drunk, in a panic,or infantile) can (logically) feel the former, while animals and infantscan feel the latter.Was Kant s obscure doctrine about  Practical Reasonsomething like this view, and Aristotle s Á ½·Ã¹ which manifests itselfsometimes in acting from premisses and which is internally connected with¸¹º ±ÁµÄ ? What do we mean by  judicious behaviour ,  scrupulousconduct ,  skilful or careful action ? It can t mean acting in consequenceof certain  sententious thinking ; for we can also say that the choiceand control of the sentences in which we think, when we think  senten-tiously , can be judicious and careful.Nor could the alleged causal connec-tions between thinking and doing (or feeling) have been discovered bythe people who speak of  judicious behaviour as an effect of  sententiousthinking , for whatever trained psychologists may do, the plain mancannot find the pure thinkings which are to be inductively correlated withthe supposedly resultant actions or feelings.So his use of phrases like judicious behaviour do not signify instances of such correlations.I have not tried to show what the differences are between conscienceand other sorts of scrupulousness.That is not my present puzzle.Norhave I tried to list all the varieties of conduct which can be described as scrupulous.There are plenty of others besides those mentioned; those,e.g., of good discipline in the Army and Navy, observance of Committeeand Parliamentary procedure, keeping to the principles of good chess,bridge, grammar, strategy, style, prosody, and of the Judge adhering to therules of admissible evidence.None of these adherences is  mere acknow-ledgment of general truths or imperatives.They are fully adopted inhabitual observance and in feeling scruples about breaking the habits [ Pobierz caÅ‚ość w formacie PDF ]