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.1988: A1).15 Managersof the PACs denied taking direction from AIPAC.AIPAC declinedcomment ( JP 15 Nov.1988: 12).At a minimum, the memorandum showedthat AIPAC monitored giving patterns and sought to influence them.AIPAC regularly rated candidates on the basis of support for Israel.16 In1987, Dine named 19 senators, including six Republicans, as  friends ofIsrael who should be supported for re-election in 1988 (NYT 7 Jul.1987:A8).In the same speech, Dine reported that in the 1985 1986 campaignseason,  AIPAC lay leaders and staff met with every senator up for re-election except one, plus 49 Senate challengers and 205 House challengers,including every new freshman member.Presidential candidates also courted AIPAC.By July 1987, 16 monthsbefore the 1988 election, nearly all presidential candidates had been inter-viewed by AIPAC and given a briefing book.Some, Dine said, asked howthey thought a planned speech  would play in the Jewish community, andsome asked AIPAC s reaction to prospective aides (NYT 6 Jul.1987: A1).Asking for a lobby s support does not prove subservience to the lobby;politicians routinely seek support from disparate groups.Most interest groupsunderstand that officeholders balance opposing interests in legislation, andcannot support them each time.17 AIPAC was different.It would track, publi-cize and punish every deviation from its positions, and no opposing groupcould compensate.Asking AIPAC for support implied a promise of fealty.AIPAC had always been assiduously bipartisan, although its staunchestsupport had come from liberal Democrats.As AIPAC changed, it and thePACs which followed its lead were increasingly identified with Republicancandidates.In 1984, Democratic candidates received 79 percent of pro-IsraelPACs contributions (WSJ 26 Feb.1985: 1).But in 1985, Republicansreceived 55 percent of that funding.The leading recipient was SenatorRobert Kasten, a social conservative who took positions opposed by themajority of Jews on prayer in schools, civil rights, and abortion (HChron 6Nov.1985: 32).Two Jewish Democratic congressmen were strongly warnednot to run against incumbent senators Bob Dole and Bob Packwood.Another strong supporter of Israel was discouraged from running againstSenator D Amato in New York (ibid.).All three incumbents were Republi-cans who had been helpful to AIPAC.Packwood had led the fight againstthe president on AWACS.In May 1988, Tom Dine essentially endorsed Vice-President Bush overthe presumptive Democratic presidential candidate, Governor Dukakis ofMassachusetts, while acknowledging that Dukakis had been  very close to102 Strength and division of the lobbythe pro-Israel/Jewish community in Boston. Dine touted Bush s pledge  tostay on the Reagan Bush course & the last eight years have been one hell ofa course (WP 29 May 1988: 12).AIPAC was facing the first change ofadministration since it had invested heavily in executive branch influence; itwas now awkwardly sorting out how best to protect its investment.By 1988, neoconservative and pro-Likud beliefs had not just definedpolicy at AIPAC, they had remade the organization.Conservative officershad initially wanted to fire all staff identified with Democrats, which wouldhave included Dine and Bloomfield.Bloomfield, the legislative director, wasperceived by the pro-Likud members of the board and staff as a dove, anopponent of executive lobbying and a liberal (Bloomfield interview).On 12December, 1988, Bloomfield was ordered to resign18 (WSJ 20 Dec.1988: 1;WP 21 Dec.1988: A9).In the summer of 1988, editors of The Near EastReport refused an order from AIPAC chair Robert Asher and presidentEdward Levy to print a statement by Max Fisher from the Republican Con-vention, urging Jews to support Republicans.By December, AIPAC officershad forced the resignations of the editorial board (ibid.).AIPAC s relationship with the government of IsraelAIPAC s mission was to build ever-stronger ties between the United Statesand Israel, if necessary to the exclusion of other relationships in the MiddleEast.Often, that entailed pressing the Congress and the president to accedeto Israel s requests  for more aid or arms, or better terms, or curtailed armssales to Arabs, or particular approaches to the peace process.Frequently,AIPAC had to explain Israeli actions that came as unpleasant surprises [ Pobierz całość w formacie PDF ]