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.This situation occurred in 1936 after the Battle of Cable Street.However, the new Police Commissioner, Sir Philip Game, putforward fresh arguments when asked to comment.He still stressedthe desirability of banning the fascists but he now stated that anti-semitism had added a new dimension to the problem since 1934.Sir Philip argued that anti-semitism appealed to a subconsciousracial instinct which was almost universal, with the Colonel Blimpsbelieving in the conspiracy theory, and that in East London it wasenvy of Jewish economic success which caused the problem; thisdevelopment represented the only real danger of fascism.Althoughcommunists were a nuisance it was fascist anti-semitism whichcaused the real headache; if this were outlawed then the problemwould be removed.Additions to the existing law which attackedthe symptoms rather than the cause were useful: if the police weregiven the power to prohibit processions and meetings, to outlawparamilitary defence corps and to ban political uniforms thiswould no doubt help, but suppression of fascist anti-semitismwould be the best solution.75Sir Philip Game s important contribution to the debate showedthat police attitudes towards fascism altered considerably during the1930s.Contrary to left-wing and anti-fascist claims, the police atthe highest levels were not biased in favour of fascism, even if therewere problems of interpretation of the law in developing conflictsituations at the street level amongst the junior ranks and localmagistrates treated anti-fascists more harshly than fascists.Sir Philipargued forcefully that there were much stronger reasons for banningfascists than communists and that political anti-semitism should beoutlawed.It was somewhat ironic that the Home Office moved fromits traditional defence of political liberty into a law and order stancejust as the main police spokesman was advocating more liberal andsocially aware arguments.The Public Order Act was to reflect thetraditional police palliatives, despite Game s lukewarm espousal ofthem, and was to ignore his more radical solution.The terms of the Act forbade the wearing of political uniforms75PRO HO 144/20159/155 62.THE BUF AND BRITISH SOCIETY85except on ceremonial occasions.The use of stewards was bannedat open air meetings, and insulting words likely to cause a breachof the peace were declared unlawful in public speeches.The policewere given the power to ban marches or alter their routes if in theopinion of the authorities they were likely to cause a breach of thepeace.In addition this ban could be applied to all political partiesin a locality for up to three months.The Public Order Act was a necessary but highly controversialpiece of legislation.It severely limited the right of free speech, afact denounced both by fascists and communists.Yet it was notclear that the Act was successful in controlling the situation after1937; in Germany the banning of political uniforms had little effecton the rise of the nazis.There was also the problem of defining theuse of insulting words and behaviour.Although the police didsuccessfully charge fascists for this crime after 1936 the punish-ment was often derisory, and police interpretation of the law wasoften inconsistent.Raven Thomson was deemed not to be insult-ing when he said at Bethnal Green in March 1937 that he had theutmost contempt for the Jews and that they were  the most miser-able type of humanity, 76 but an Inspector Jones was overruledwhen he reported that Mick Clarke had used no inflammatorylanguage at the same venue in June 1937, when other policeshorthand notes stated that Clarke had called the Jews  greasyScum and  the lice of the earth.77 During the election campaignof March 1937 there were numerous complaints that the policefailed to take action against provocative statements and actionsagainst Jews by the fascists.Numerous assaults, cases of windowsmashing and the dissemination of graffiti continued unabated.The nature of the fascist impact in the East End of London wasdemonstrated in the first local elections of 1937.In the LCC elec-tions of March 1937 the British Union, as it then called itself,attained 23 per cent of the vote in North East Bethnal Green, 19per cent in Stepney (Limehouse) and 14 per cent in Shoreditch.Sixmonths later in the municipal elections it fought eight seats in fiveLondon boroughs.In six seats it finished second, with a bestperformance of 22 per cent in Bethnal Green North East.OutsideLondon the British Union performed disastrously, with its76PRO Mepo 2/3109.77PRO Mepo 2/3115.THE BUF AND BRITISH SOCIETY86candidates in Leeds, Manchester, Sheffield and Southampton allfinishing bottom of the poll.Even in its stronghold of East Londonthe BUF s impact was patchy.It never came close to winning anelection anywhere and, despite the fears of Harry Pollitt, theCommunist leader, it made little impact in London docklandaround Wapping.Political anti-semitism attracted mass supportfor the BUF in a limited geographical area, but it engendered greaterhostility within those same localities and had counter-productiveconsequences elsewhere.Mosley s dream of a fascist nation wasreduced to the reality of a minority anti-semitic political sub-culture in some areas of the East End of London.If the use of political anti-semitism can be seen as a crucial stagein the decline of the BUF from a national movement to a localizedracial populist organization, then its attempt to resurrect its politi-cal pretensions in the Peace Campaign of 1938 40 merely hastenedits inevitable total destruction.The campaign was at best onlypartially successful in recovering the fortunes of the BUF in 1938 9 [ Pobierz całość w formacie PDF ]