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.Crucially, how-ever, it is also the result of the human capacity for meta-representation,and it is this which facilitates the development of alternative RSs.Thesenonlinguistic systems, whose rules and structures are incredibly diverse,must be realized in a medium which is not subject to the constraints ofuniversal grammar.I have defended this hypothesis against the charges that true replica-tion is not possible across media, and that cultural information is notgenuinely particulate.Conversely, I have suggested that it is supportedby its compatibility with the most widely accepted theory of language,Chomsky s language acquisition device.There have been echoes, throughout these discussions, of a now famil-iar issue.If the development of cultural RSs depends on our biologicalendowment (e.g., our innate knowledge of language rules and abilityto meta-represent), so that our acquisition of memes is tightly interwo-ven with the development of our minds, then what is the relationshipbetween the two? How independent are memes of the mind? The nextchapter asks to what extent cultural evolution is driven by our own mentalfaculties, rather than by the memes which are its units of replication.12Memes and the MindIt is time to explore in more detail the relation between memes and themind.In the case of genes and the body, the relationship is one betweena survival machine and the replicators that are its formative constituents.This is a reciprocal relationship, in which the body is built (and in someways acts) in accordance with a genetic blueprint, and the genes are se-lected via their phenotypic effects, which in combination produce anindividual organism.To what extent is the relationship between memesand the mind an analogous one? Are memes self-replicators, or are theymore like passive pieces of information, wholly dependent on humanminds for their activation  much as genes depend on the cellular appa-ratus to make copies of themselves?The nature of the memes-mind relationship has been a recurring issuethroughout the discussions so far.The Dennett-Blackmore hypothesis isthat there is in reality no distinction between the two.An alternativeview is that a significant part of our mental architecture is determinedby our genotype, with cultural input making only a superficial impacton our mental capacities.My own thesis has been that our innate (i.e.,endowed by our genes) mental potential is developed by interacting withour environment  a crucial element of which is memetic.This is notto deny the novelty and autonomy of cultural evolution as a genuinelydifferent process from Darwinian selection in the natural world; it issimply to acknowledge that the mind s evolution is ultimately dependenton its genetic roots.168Memes and the Mind 169Beliefs as Memes?The main threat to my proposition comes from theorists such as Dennettand Blackmore, who argue that the self is a vast complex of memes:humans should be seen as  the clever imitation machine taking part inthis new evolutionary process, rather than a conscious entity who canstand outside of it and direct it.1 That this thesis sounds bizarre andunappealing is not sufficient grounds for its dismissal.Indeed, one ofthe reasons why we find such an idea hard to accept, says Blackmore, isthat memes are incredibly good at deceiving us (of course she doesn tmean that they do this consciously): they can gain a huge advantage bybecoming closely associated with our idea of  self.She asks us to imaginetwo memes, one which represents an idea and the other a belief in thatidea: in the memetic struggle for survival, she suggests, the belief is boundto be selected over the idea.Beliefs will gain the advantage because wetend to defend them and try to persuade others to share them, whilst atthe same time  by being expressed as  my belief  they encourage ourconviction  that there is a real self at the centre of it all. 2There are several reasons why I am not persuaded by this particular be-lief of Blackmore s.Firstly, beliefs are not memes, but responses to memes.Even when someone is doing her best to persuade you to share her be-liefs, the most she can do is to present information to you in a formatwhich she hopes will encourage you to adopt her own approach to it.Weare all familiar with at least some of the beliefs that our friends hold dear,on subjects like politics, religion and child rearing, yet each of us holdsa variety of attitudes to those beliefs: some we also hold dear, some wereject totally, and on others we retain an open mind.A term from philosophy,  propositional attitudes , is illuminating here.Given a proposition, such as  it will rain today, I can hold a range ofattitudes towards it: I can hope that it will rain today, or believe that it willrain today, or be in one of any number of mental states in relation to thatproposition; those mental states are my  propositional attitudes.Now,this is a concept shrouded in some philosophical controversy, which Icould not hope to disperse here  but nonetheless it emphasises thefact that we react in various ways to the information with which we arepresented.Belief is simply one of those possible reactions.Moreover, on closer inspection it is clear that Blackmore s referenceto beliefs as memes actually begs the question in favour of her mainhypothesis: only if (as she claims) the self is a meme-complex can mentalstates such as beliefs and desires count as memes.If, on the other hand,170 The Selfish Memethere is a genuine distinction between memes and the minds with whichthey interact, then beliefs will more accurately be seen as mental statesthan as the information to which those states pertain.The self, on thisview, is a conscious entity which responds to incoming information in avariety of ways, both cognitively and emotionally.Cultural information,then, is something separate from the agents who process it [ Pobierz całość w formacie PDF ]